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A legislative contagion seemed to sweep across the Midwest during the early months of 2011. First, Wisconsin legislators wanted to strip public employees of the right to bargain. Then, Indiana legislators got into the act. Then, it was Ohio. In each case, Republican governors and Republican-controlled state legislatures had in-

troduced substantially similar bills that sought sweeping changes to each state’s collective bargaining statutes and various school funding provisions.

A smart ALEC threatens public education

Coordinated efforts to introduce model legislation aimed at defunding and dismantling public schools is the signature work of this conservative organization.

By Julie Underwood and Julie F. Mead

JULIE UNDERWOOD ([email protected]) is professor and dean of the School of Education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. She previously served as general counsel of the National School Boards Association. JULIE F. MEAD is pro- fessor and chair of the Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Analysis at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect those of the University of Wisconsin.

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52 Kappan March 2012

agree — granting considerable power to the corpo- rate side. Elected officials then take the model bills back to their states to introduce them as their own. Only legislators who are members may access the model legislation (http://www.alec.org/wp-content/ uploads/2011_legislative_brochure.pdf). It is a very efficient mechanism for corporations to exercise po- litical power — and they have.

ALEC in Tennessee

Recent legislation in Tennessee provides a vivid example. ALEC created and provided members its model Virtual Public Schools Act. Two large for-profit corporate providers of virtual education, Connections Academy and K-12 Inc., had heavy involvement with the model bill’s creation. Mickey Revenaugh, a lob- byist for Connections Academy, was the corporate chair of ALEC’s Education Task Force and Lisa Gil- lis, with K-12 Inc., chaired its special needs education subcommittee that created the bill. Tennessee’s State Rep. Harry Brooks and State Sen. Dolores Gresham, both ALEC Education Task Force members, intro- duced the bill to their respective houses nearly ver- batim, even using the same title. For example, the following passage forms the preamble of the adopted statute. Underlined portions were taken directly from ALEC’s model.

WHEREAS, meeting the educational needs of children in our state’s schools is of the greatest importance to the future welfare of Tennessee; and

WHEREAS, closing the achievement gap be- tween high-performing students, including the gap between minority and nonminority stu- dents and between economically disadvantaged students and their more advantaged peers, is a significant and present challenge; and

WHEREAS, providing a broader range of edu- cational options to parents and utilizing exist- ing resources, along with technology, may help students in our state improve their academic achievement; and

WHEREAS, many of our school districts cur- rently lack the capacity to provide other public school choices for students whose schools are low performing; now, therefore

The purpose of this part is to provide an LEA with an alternative choice to offer additional educational resources in an effort to improve academic achievement. (Virtual Public Schools Act, 2011).

The bill passed both houses on a party-line vote

What was going on? How could elected officials in multiple states suddenly introduce essentially the same legislation?

The answer: The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). Its self-described legislative ap- proach to education reads:

Across the country for the past two decades, education reform efforts have popped up in legislatures at dif- ferent times in different places. As a result, teachers’ unions have been playing something akin to “whack- a-mole” — you know the game — striking down as many education reform efforts as possible. Many times, the unions successfully “whack” the “mole,” i.e., the reform legislation. Sometimes, however, they miss. If all the moles pop up at once, there is no way the person with the mallet can get them all. Introduce comprehensive reform packages. (Ladner, LeFevre, & Lips, 2010, p. 108)

ALEC’s own “whack-a-mole” strategy also reveals the group’s ultimate goal. Every gardener who has ever had to deal with a mole knows that the animals undermine and ultimately destroy a garden. ALEC’s positions on various education issues make it clear that the organization seeks to undermine public edu- cation by systematically defunding and ultimately destroying public education as we know it.

What is ALEC?

Technically, ALEC (www.alec.org) is a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C. It describes itself as a nonpartisan membership organization for those who share a common belief in “limited govern- ment, free markets, federalism, and individual lib- erty” (www.alec.org/about-alec). More than 2,000 state lawmakers pay ALEC $100 for a two-year membership. While listed as nonpartisan, ALEC’s members definitely skew to the conservative end of the political spectrum. For example, of the 114 listed members of the group’s Education Task Force, 108 are Republicans, and only six are Democrats.

Corporations, foundations, and “think tanks” can join ALEC, too. They pay up to $25,000 in yearly dues and can spend more to sponsor the council’s meetings. Corporate members can also donate to each state’s scholarship fund, which reimburses leg- islators who travel to meetings. The scholarships can exceed the amount of a legislator’s dues. Corporate members also can pay from $3,000 to $10,000 for a seat on a task force.

ALEC operates through nine task forces, each cochaired by a corporate member and a legislative member. Task forces are divided by subject and bring together conservative policy makers with corporate leaders to develop model legislation. In order for a proposal to become model legislation, both the public and private sides of the committee must

V93 N6 kappanmagazine.org 53

LeFevre, & Lips, 2010, p. 82) to be carried out through model legislation such as Alternative Certification Act, Great Teachers and Lead- ers Act, National Teacher Certification Fair- ness Act, Public School Union Release Time Act, School Collective Bargaining Agreement Sunshine Act, and Teacher Choice Compensa- tion Act. There’s also a set of proposals (Pub- lic School Financial Transparency Act; School Board Freedom to Contract Act) that encour- age school districts to outsource their auxiliary services.

Privatize education through vouchers, char- ters, and tax incentives (Ladner, LeFevre, & Lips, 2010, p. 87) to be carried out through model legislation such as Foster Child Scholarship Program Act, Great Schools Tax Credit, Mili- tary Family Scholarship Program Act, Parental Choice Scholarship Accountability Act, Paren- tal Choice Scholarship Program Act (means- tested eligibility), Parental Choice Scholarship Program Act (universal eligibility), Parental Choice Scholarship Program Act (universal eligibility, means-tested scholarship amount), Parental Choice Scholarship Tax Credit Ac- countability Act, Education Enterprise Zone Act, Smart Start Scholarship Program, Special Needs Scholarship Program Act, Family Educa- tion Savings Account Act, Parental Rights Act, Resolution Supporting Private Scholarship Tax Credits, Autism Scholarship Program Act, and Family Education Tax Credit Program Act.

Increase student testing and reporting (Lad- ner, LeFevre, & Lips, 2010, p. 93) to be carried out through model legislation such as Resolu- tion Supporting the Principles of No Child Left Behind Act, Student Right to Learn Act, Educa- tion Accountability Act, Longitudinal Student Growth Act, One to One Reading Improvement Act, and Resolution on Nonverified Science Curriculum Funding.

Reduce the influence of or eliminate local school districts and school boards (Ladner, LeFevre, & Lips, 2010, p. 96) to be carried out through model legislation such as Charter Schools Act, Innovation Schools and School Districts Act, Open Enrollment Act, Virtual Public Schools Act, and Next Generation Char- ter Schools Act.

ALEC’s special interest in privatization

While ALEC’s forays into education policy are broad, privatization of public education has been a long-standing ALEC objective. As early as 1985,

on June 16, 2011. Shortly thereafter, K-12 Inc. — one of the creators of the model legislation — won a no-bid contract from Union County School District to create the Tennessee Virtual Academy and will re- ceive about $5,300 per student from the state for the 2011-12 school year (Humphrey, 2011). Connec- tions Academy does not yet offer a virtual school in Tennessee, but its web site reports that it “is actively working with parent groups, education officials, and others to launch a school in this state.”

The Chattanooga Times Free Press (Sept. 2, 2011) reported that about 2,000 students applied for en- rollment in the Tennessee Virtual Academy for fall 2011. Recent reports raise concerns that the pro- gram’s popularity with home schoolers may “drain taxpayer funds” while enriching the corporation ac- tively and aggressively recruiting students to enroll (Locker, 2011). Locker also reports that “K-12 Inc. compensated its CEO more than $2.6 million last year, its chief financial officer more than $1.7 million, and other top executives several hundred thousand dollars each, according to its latest annual report to shareholders.”

ALEC on education

ALEC’s success in Tennessee is by no means its only incursion into state education policy. ALEC’s interest in education is ambitious and multifaceted, and includes promoting dozens of model acts to its legislative members (Ladner, LeFevre, & Lips, 2010). Proposed bills seek to influence teacher cer- tification, teacher evaluation, collective bargaining, curriculum, funding, special education, student as- sessment, and numerous other education and edu- cation-related issues. Common throughout the bills are proposals to decrease local control of schools by democratically elected school boards while increas- ing access to all facets of education by private enti- ties and corporations. ALEC’s outlined agenda is to:

Introduce market factors into schools, par- ticularly the teaching profession (Ladner,

Common throughout the bills are proposals

to decrease local control of schools by

democratically elected school boards while

increasing access to all facets of education

to private entities and corporations.

54 Kappan March 2012

1990. Although the Milwaukee voucher program had the backing of leaders from other philosophic camps, including Howard Fuller, a former superin- tendent of Milwaukee Public Schools and current board member of Black Alliance for Educational Op- tions, the legislation was modeled after the rubric ALEC provided in its 1985 Education Source Book. ALEC’s hand in this program continues. In 2011, one of the ultimately defeated amendments to the Milwaukee program proposed removing all income requirements for participating students, a proposal laid out in ALEC’s Parental Choice Scholarship Pro- gram Act (universal eligibility) and a step toward a full-scale state voucher program.

In fact, to help states advance school choice without running afoul of state constitutional lim- itations, ALEC published School Choice and State Constitutions (Komer & Neily, 2007) to provide a state-by-state analysis and promote programs tai- lored to foster privatization. Since then, a number of states have adopted the ALEC recommenda- tions. For example:

Arizona: Vouchers for foster children, special ed- ucation vouchers, and tax credits;

Indiana: Means-tested vouchers, special education vouchers, tax deductions for private school tuition and home-schooling expenses, and tax credits;

Georgia: Special education vouchers and the newer ALEC proposal — tax incentives for contributions to scholarship-granting organizations;

ALEC’s motivation for privatization was made clear (Barrett, 1985).

As schools became larger and society more mobile, teachers and superintendents grew further removed from parents and, all too frequently, from the students themselves. Policies dictated from state capitals and Washington, D.C., placed burdens on public schools to compensate for economic disadvantages in fam- ily backgrounds and overcome centuries-old preju- dices, to confer equality on youngsters with physical or mental handicaps, and to transmit our common culture while preserving each of its diverse elements. As a result, public schools were forced to meet all of the needs of all the people without pleasing anyone. (Barrett, 1985, p. 7)

In response, ALEC offered model legislation to “foster educational freedom and quality” through privatization (Barrett, 1985, p. 8). Privatization takes multiple forms: vouchers, tax incentives for sending children to private schools, and charter schools oper- ated by for-profit entities.

Today, ALEC calls this approach “choice” and renames vouchers “scholarships,” but its aim is clear: Defund and dismantle public schools. While many other right-wing organizations support this agenda, ALEC is the mechanism for implementing it through its many pieces of model legislation that propose legislative methods for defunding public schools, particularly low-income, urban schools.

The motivation for dismantling the public edu- cation system — creating a system where schools do not provide for everyone — is ideological, and it is motivated by profit. The corporate members on ALEC’s education task force include represen- tatives from the Friedman Foundation, Goldwater Institute, Evergreen Education Group, Washington Policy Center, and corporations providing education services such as Sylvan Learning and K-12, Inc. All stand to benefit from public funding sent in their direction.

The first large-scale voucher program, the Mil- waukee Parental Choice Program, was enacted in

By elevating parental choice over all other

values, the ALEC push for privatization

supports schools that can be segregated by

academic ability and disability, ethnicity,

economics, language, and culture.

“Good night, dear. Text me if you need anything.”

V93 N6 kappanmagazine.org 55

Ultimately, however, the most important ques- tion we must all ask is whether ALEC’s influence builds or undermines democracy.

Certain public institutions — courts, legislatures, fire protection, police departments, and yes, schools — must remain public to serve a democratic society. Through public education we have expressed and ex- panded our shared public values. As Benjamin Barber (1997) states, “Public schools are not merely schools for the public, but schools of publicness: institutions where we learn what it means to be a public and start down the road toward common national and civic identity” (p. 22).

What happens to our democracy when we return to an educational system where access is defined by corporate interest and divided by class, language, ability, race, and religion? In a push to free-market education, who pays in the end? K

References

Barber, B. (1997). Public schooling: Education for democracy.

In J.I. Goodlad & T.J. McMannon (Eds.), The public purpose

of education and schooling (pp. 21-32). San Francisco, CA:

Jossey-Bass.

Barrett, N. (1985). Education source book: The state

legislators’ guide for reform. Washington, DC: American

Legislative Exchange Council.

Humphrey, T. (2011, August 15). TN Virtual Academy builds

enrollment controversy. Humphrey on the Hill. (Web log post).

http://blogs.knoxnews.com/humphrey/2011/08/tn-virtual-

academy-builds-enro.html

Komer, R. & Neily, C. (2007). School choice and state

constitutions: A guide to designing school choice programs.

Washington, DC: Institute for Justice and American Legislative

Exchange Council.

Ladner, M., LeFevre, A., & Lips, D. (2010). Report card on

American education: Ranking state K-12 performance,

progress, and reform (16th ed.). Washington, DC: American

Legislative Exchange Council.

Locker, R. (2011, September 24). Virtual school in Tennessee

may drain taxpayer funds. The Commercial Appeal.

Virtual Public Schools Act, Tennessee House Bill No. 1030.

(2011).

Orfield, G. & Lee, C. (2007). Historic reversals, accelerating

resegregation and the need for new integration strategies. Los

Angeles, CA: Civil Rights Project.

Rogers, J. & Dresser, L. (2011, July 12). ALEC exposed:

Business domination Inc. The Nation.

“Virtual school” hits enrollment hiccup. (2011, September 2).

The Chattanooga Times Free Press.

Louisiana: Tax deductions for private school tuition and home-schooling expenses, means- tested vouchers, special education vouchers; and

Oklahoma: Tax credits, special education vouchers, and the newer ALEC proposal — the tax incentives for contributions to scholarship- granting organizations.

By elevating parental choice over all other values, the ALEC push for privatization supports schools that can be segregated by academic ability and dis- ability, ethnicity, economics, language, and culture. They would be the natural outgrowth of parents’ un- fettered choices in a free-market system. Increased racial isolation would likely result, exacerbating cur- rent trends toward resegregation (Orfield & Lee, 2007). In addition, as seen in Tennessee, a fully re- alized ALEC agenda would undoubtedly result in more public education dollars bolstering the balance sheets of for-profit education vendors.

Identifying ALEC’s influence

Returning to the protests that rocked our state and others, it became clear that ALEC had sig- nificant influence on the contested provisions. As Rogers and Dresser (2011) document, proposals in Wisconsin and other states were drawn from sev- eral ALEC legislative models, including the “Right to Work Act [that] eliminates employee obligation to pay the costs of collective bargaining; the Public Employee Freedom Act [that] bars almost any action to induce it; the Public Employer Payroll Deduction Act [that] bars automatic dues collection; [and] the Voluntary Contribution Act [that] bars the use of dues for political activity.”

Does ALEC’s influence build or undermine democracy?

Whether you believe that ALEC has the issues right or wrong, the organization clearly wields con- siderable power and influence over state educa- tion policy. But perhaps by boldly sending so many “moles” to legislative surfaces all at once, ALEC has permitted those concerned with the influence of cor- porate interests on public education to awaken to its strategy. From now on, champions of public educa- tion have a new set of questions to ask whenever legislation is introduced:

• Is the sponsor a member of ALEC? • Does the bill borrow from ALEC model

legislation? • What corporations had a hand in drafting the

legislation? • What interests would benefit or even profit

from its passage?

8 Kappan March 2012

LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND ([email protected]) is the Charles Ducommun professor of teaching and teacher education, Stan- ford University, Stanford, Calif. AUDREY AMREIN-BEARDSLEY is an associate professor of education, Arizona State University, Phoenix, Ariz. EDWARD HAERTEL is the Jacks Family professor of education, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. JESSE ROTH- STEIN is an associate professor of economics and public policy, University of California, Berkeley.

P ractitioners, researchers, and policy makers agree that most current teacher evaluation sys- tems do little to help teachers improve or to support personnel decision making. There’s also a growing consensus that evidence of teacher contributions to student learning should be part of teacher evaluation systems, along with evidence about the quality of teacher practices. “Value-added models” (VAMs), designed to evaluate student test score gains from one year to

the next, are often promoted as tools to accomplish this goal. Value-added models enable researchers to use statistical methods to measure changes in student scores

over time while considering student characteristics and other factors often found to influence achievement. In large-scale studies, these methods have proved valuable for looking at factors affecting achievement and measuring the effects of programs or interventions.

Using VAMs for individual teacher evaluation is based on the belief that measured achievement gains for a specific teacher’s students reflect that teacher’s “effectiveness.” This attribution, however, assumes that student learning is measured well by a given test, is influenced by the teacher alone, and is independent from the growth of classmates and other aspects of the classroom context. None of these assumptions is well supported by current evidence.

Most importantly, research reveals that gains in student achievement are influenced by much more than any individual teacher. Others factors include:

• School factors such as class sizes, curriculum materials, instructional time, availability of specialists and tutors, and resources for learning (books, computers, science labs, and more);

• Home and community supports or challenges; • Individual student needs and abilities, health, and attendance; • Peer culture and achievement; • Prior teachers and schooling, as well as other current teachers; • Differential summer learning loss, which especially affects low-income children; and • The specific tests used, which emphasize some kinds of learning and not others and which rarely

measure achievement that is well above or below grade level.

However, value-added models don’t actually measure most of these factors. VAMs rely on statistical controls for past achievement to parse out the small portion of student gains that is due to other factors,

Evaluating teacher evaluation Popular modes of evaluating teachers are fraught with inaccuracies and inconsistencies, but the field has identified better approaches.

By Linda Darling-Hammond, Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, Edward Haertel, and Jesse Rothstein

V93 N6 kappanmagazine.org 9 Thinkstock/iStockphoto

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of which the teacher is only one. As a consequence, researchers have documented a number of problems with VAM models as accurate measures of teachers’ effectiveness.

1. Value-added models of teacher effectiveness are inconsistent.

Researchers have found that teacher effectiveness ratings differ substantially from class to class and from year to year, as well as from one statistical model to the next, as Table 1 shows.

A study examining data from fi ve school districts found, for example, that of teachers who scored in the bottom 20% of rankings in one year, only 20% to 30% had similar ratings the next year, while 25% to 45% of these teachers moved to the top part of the distribution, scoring well above average. (See Figure 1.) The same was true for those who scored at the top of the distribution in one year: A small minority stayed in the same rating band the follow- ing year, while most scores moved to other parts of the distribution.

Teacher effectiveness also varies signifi cantly when different statistical methods are used (Briggs & Domingue, 2011; Newton et al., 2010; Rothstein, 2007). For example, when researchers used a differ- ent model to recalculate the value-added scores for teachers published in the Los Angeles Times in 2011, they found that from 40% to 55% of them would get noticeably different scores (Briggs & Domingue, 2011).

Teachers’ value-added scores also differ signifi – cantly when different tests are used, even when these are within the same content area (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2010; Lockwood et al., 2007). This raises concerns both about measurement er-

TABLE 1.

Percent of teachers whose effectiveness rankings change

Across models a

Across courses b

Across years b

Note: a Depending on pair of models compared. b Depending on the model used. Source: Newton, Darling-Hammond, Haertel, & Thomas (2010).

BY 1 OR MORE DECILES

56-80%

85-100%

74-93%

BY 2 OR MORE DECILES

12-33%

54-92%

45-63%

BY 3 OR MORE DECILES

0-14%

39-54%

19-41%

ror and, when teacher evaluation results are tied to student test scores, the effects of emphasiz- ing “teaching to the test” at the expense of other kinds of learning, especially given the narrowness of most tests in the United States.

2. Teachers’ value-added performance is affected by the students assigned to them.

VAMs are designed to identify teachers’ effects

Teachers’ value-added scores differ signifi cantly when different tests are used, even when these are within the same content area.

10 Kappan March 2012

when students are assigned to teachers randomly. However, students aren’t randomly assigned to teachers — and statistical models can’t fully adjust for the fact that some teachers will have a dispropor- tionate number of students who have greater chal- lenges (e.g., students with poor attendance, who are homeless, who have severe problems at home, etc.) and those whose scores on traditional tests may not accurately reflect their learning (e.g., those who have special education needs or who are new English language learners).

Even when the model includes controls for prior achievement and student demographic variables, teachers are advantaged or disadvantaged based on the students they teach. Several studies have shown this by conducting tests that look at teacher “ef- fects” on students’ prior test scores. Logically, for example, 5th-grade teachers can’t influence their students’ 3rd-grade test scores. So a VAM that iden- tifies teachers’ true effects should show no effect of 5th-grade teachers on students’ 3rd-grade test scores two years earlier. But studies that have looked at this

have shown large “effects” — which indicates that the VAMs wrongly attribute to teachers other influ- ences on student performance that are present when the teachers have no contact with the students (Roth- stein, 2010).

One study that found considerable instability in teachers’ value-added scores from class to class and year to year examined changes in student charac- teristics associated with changes in teacher ratings. After controlling for prior student test scores and stu- dent characteristics, the study still found significant correlations between teacher ratings and students’ race/ethnicity, income, language background, and parent education. Figure 2 illustrates this finding for an experienced English teacher whose rating went from the very lowest category in one year to the very highest category the next year (a jump from the 1st to the 10th decile). In the second year, this teacher had many fewer English learners, Hispanic students, and low-income students, and more students with well-educated parents than in the first year.

This variability raises concerns that using such ratings for evaluating teachers could create disin- centives for teachers to serve high-need students.

3. Value-added ratings can’t disentangle the many influences on student progress.

Given all of the other factors operating, it appears

FIG. 1.

Changes in VA scores from 2001 to 2002 for low-ranking teachers

100-

90-

80 –

70-

60-

50-

40-

30-

20-

10-

0-

Move to above average (Top

40%)

Move up in rankings

Stay in bottom 20%

San Diego Duval Co., Hillsborough Co., Orange Co., Palm Beach Co., Calif. Fla. Fla. Fla. Fla.

School districts

P e rc

e n ta

g e o

f te

a c h e rs

Source: Sass, T. (2008).

Teachers are advantaged or disadvantaged based on the students they teach.

V93 N6 kappanmagazine.org 11

Houston as a result of its Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS) scores was a 10-year veteran who had been voted Teacher of the Month and Teacher of the Year and was rated each year as “exceeding expectations” by her supervisor (Amrein- Beardsley & Collins, in press). She showed positive VA scores on 8 of 16 tests over four years (50% of the total observations), with wide fluctuations from year to year, both across and within subjects. (See Table 2.) It is worth noting that this teacher’s lower value-added in 4th grade, when English learners are mainstreamed in Houston, was also a pattern for many other teachers.

The wide variability shown in this teacher’s rat- ings from year to year, like that documented in many other studies, wasn’t unusual for Houston teachers in this analysis, regardless of whether the teacher was terminated. Teachers said they couldn’t identify a relationship between their instructional practices and their value-added ratings, which appear unpre- dictable. As one teacher noted:

I do what I do every year. I teach the way I teach every year. [My] first year got me pats on the back; [my] second year got me kicked in the backside. And for year three, my scores were off the charts. I got a huge bonus, and now I am in the top quartile of all the English teachers. What did I do differently? I have no clue (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, in press).

that “teacher effectiveness” is not a stable enough construct to be uniquely identified even under ideal conditions (for example, with random assignment of teachers to schools and students to teachers, and with some means of controlling differences in out- of-school effects). Furthermore, some teachers may be effective at some forms of instruction or in some portions of the curriculum and less effective in oth- ers. If so, their rated effectiveness would depend on whether the student tests used for the VAM empha- size skills and topics for which the teacher is relatively more or relatively less effective.

Other research indicates that teachers whose students do best on end-of-year tests aren’t always effective at promoting longer-run achievement for their students. Thus, VAM-style measures may be influenced by how much the teacher emphasizes short-run test preparation. One study even found that teachers who raised end-of-course grades most were, on average, less effective than others at prepar- ing students for next year’s course (Carrell & West, 2010).

Initial research on using value-added methods to dismiss some teachers and award bonuses to oth- ers shows that value-added ratings often don’t agree with ratings from skilled observers and are influ- enced by all of the factors described above.

For example, one of the teachers dismissed in

Deepen your understanding of this article with questions and activities in this month’s Kappan Professional Development Discussion Guide by Lois Brown Easton. Download a PDF of the guide at kappan magazine.org.

FIG. 2.

Student characteristics in years 1 and 2 for a teacher whose ranking changed from the 1st to the 10th decile

80 –

70-

60-

50-

40-

30-

20-

10-

0-

Year 1

Year 2

% % % Parent ELL Low-income Hispanic education (in years)

Student characteristics

P e rc

e n ta

g e /y

e a rs

58

4

42

26

75

36

20.4

31.6

12 Kappan March 2012

• Ratings change considerably when teachers change grade levels, often from “ineffective” to “effective” and vice versa.

These kinds of comments from teachers were typical:

Every year, I have the highest test scores, [and] I have fellow teachers that come up to me when they get their bonuses . . . One recently came up to me [and] literally cried, ‘I’m so sorry.’ . . . I’m like, ‘Don’t be sorry. It’s not your fault.’ Here I am . . . with the highest test scores, and I’m getting $0 in bonuses. It makes no sense year to year how this works. You know, I don’t know what to do. I don’t know how to get higher than 100%.

I went to a transition classroom, and now there’s a red flag next to my name. I guess now I’m an ineffective teacher? I keep getting letters from the district, saying ‘You’ve been recognized as an outstanding teacher’ . . . this, this, and that. But now because I teach English language learners who ‘transition in,’ my scores drop? And I get a flag next to my name for not teaching them well? (Amrein-Beardsley & Collins, in press).

A study of Tennessee teachers who volunteered to be evaluated based on VAMs and to have a substan- tial share of their compensation tied to their VAM results, corroborated this evidence: After three years, 85% thought the VAM evaluation ignored impor- tant aspects of their performance that test scores didn’t measure, and two-thirds thought VAM didn’t do a good job of distinguishing effective from inef- fective teachers (Springer et al., 2010).

Other approaches

For all of these reasons and more, most research- ers have concluded that value-added modeling is not appropriate as a primary measure for evaluating in- dividual teachers. (See, for example, Braun, 2005; National Research Council, 2009.)

While value-added models based on test scores

Another teacher classified her past three years as “bonus, bonus, disaster.” And another noted:

We had an 8th-grade teacher, a very good teacher, the “real science guy”. . . [but] every year he showed low EVAAS growth. My principal flipped him with the 6th-grade science teacher who was getting the highest EVAAS scores on campus. Huge EVAAS scores. [And] now the 6th-grade teacher [is showing] no growth, but the 8th-grade teacher who was sent down is getting the biggest bonuses on campus.

This example of two teachers whose value-added ratings flip-flopped when they exchanged assign- ments is an example of a phenomenon found in other studies that document a larger association between the class taught and value-added ratings than the individual teacher effect itself. The notion that there is a stable “teacher effect” that’s a function of the teacher’s teaching ability or effectiveness is called into question if the specific class or grade-level as- signment is a stronger predictor of the value-added rating than the teacher.

Another Houston teacher whose supervisor con- sistently rated her as “exceeding expectations” or “proficient” and who also was receiving positive VA scores about 50% of the time, had a noticeable drop in her value-added ratings when a large number of English language learners transitioned into her class- room. Overall, the study found that, in this system:

• Teachers of grades in which English language learners (ELLs) are transitioned into mainstreamed classrooms are the least likely to show “added value.”

• Teachers of large numbers of special education students in mainstreamed classrooms are also found to have lower “value-added” scores, on average.

• Teachers of gifted students show little value- added because their students are already near the top of the test score range.

EVAAS scores (Teacher A)

TABLE 2.

2006-2010 EVAAS scores of a teacher dismissed as a result of these scores

Math

Reading

Language arts

Science

Social studies

ASPIRE bonus

Notes: * The scores with asterisks (*) signify that the scores are not detectably different from the reference gain scores of other teachers across Houston Independent School District within one standard error; however, the scores are still reported to both the teachers and their supervisors as they are here.

GRADE 5

2006-2007

GRADE 4

2007-2008

GRADE 3

2008-2009

GRADE 3

2009-2010

-2.03

-1.15

+1.12

+2.37

+0.91*

$3,400

+0.68*

-0.96*

-0.49*

-3.45

-2.39

$700

+0.16*

+2.03

-1.77

n/a

n/a

$3,700

+03.26

+1.81

-0.20*

n/a

n/a

$0

V93 N6 kappanmagazine.org 13

ground evaluation in student learning in more stable ways. Typically, performance assessments ask teach- ers to document their plans and teaching for a unit of instruction linked to state standards, adapt them for special education students and English language learners, videotape and critique lessons, and collect and evaluate evidence of student learning.

Professional standards have also been translated into teacher evaluation instruments at the local level. Cincinnati Public Schools uses an unusually care- ful standards-based system for teacher evaluation that involves multiple classroom observations and detailed written feedback to teachers. This system, like several others in local districts, has been found both to produce ratings that reflect teachers’ effec- tiveness in supporting student learning gains and to improve teachers’ performance and their future ef- fectiveness (Milanowski, Kimball & White, 2004; Milanowski, 2004; Rockoff & Speroni, 2010; Taylor & Tyler, 2011.)

A Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation initiative is identifying additional tools based on professional standards and validated against student achievement gains to be used in teacher evaluation at the local level. The Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) Project has developed a number of tools, includ- ing observations or videotapes of teachers, supple- mented with other artifacts of practice (lesson plans, assignments, etc.), that can be scored according to standards that reflect practices associated with ef- fective teaching.

Building better systems

Systems that help teachers improve and that sup- port timely and efficient personnel decisions have more than good instruments. Successful systems use multiple classroom observations across the year by expert evaluators looking at multiple sources of data, and they provide timely and meaningful feedback to the teacher.

For example, schools using the Teacher Advance- ment Program, which is based on NBPTS and IN- TASC standards as well as the standards-based as- sessment rubrics developed in Connecticut (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2010; Rothstein, 2011),

are problematic for making evaluation decisions for individual teachers, they are useful for looking at groups of teachers for research purposes — for ex- ample, to examine how specific teaching practices or measures of teaching influence the learning of large numbers of students. Such analyses provide other in- sights for teacher evaluation because we have a large body of evidence over many decades concerning how specific teaching practices influence student learning gains. For example, we know that effective teachers:

• Understand subject matter deeply and flexibly; • Connect what is to be learned to students’ prior

knowledge and experience; • Create effective scaffolds and supports for

learning; • Use instructional strategies that help students

draw connections, apply what they’re learning, practice new skills, and monitor their own learning;

• Assess student learning continuously and adapt teaching to student needs;

• Provide clear standards, constant feedback, and opportunities for revising work; and

• Develop and effectively manage a collab- orative classroom in which all students have membership (Darling-Hammond & Bransford, 2005).

These aspects of effective teaching, supported by research, have been incorporated into professional standards for teaching that offer some useful ap- proaches to teacher evaluation.

Using professional standards

The National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) defined accomplished teach- ing to guide assessments for veteran teachers. Sub- sequently, a group of states working together under the auspices of the Council for Chief State School Officers created the Interstate New Teacher Assess- ment and Support Consortium (INTASC), which translated these into standards for beginning teach- ers that have been adopted by over 40 states for initial teacher licensing. Revised INTASC teaching stan- dards have been aligned with the Common Core Standards to reflect the knowledge, skills, and under- standings that teachers need to enact the standards.

These standards have become the basis for as- sessments of teaching that produce ratings that are much more stable than value-added measures. At the same time, these standards incorporate class- room evidence of student learning, and large-scale studies have shown that they can predict teachers’ value-added effectiveness (National Research Coun- cil, 2008; Wilson et al., 2011), so they have helped

The notion that there is a stable “teacher effect” that’s a function of the teacher’s teaching ability or effectiveness is called into question if the specific class or grade- level assignment is a stronger predictor of the value-added rating than the teacher.

14 Kappan March 2012

surable outcomes in hard-to-quantify areas like art, music, and physical education; and to monitor stu- dent learning growth. They also showed a greater awareness of the importance of sound curriculum development, more alignment of curriculum with district objectives, and increased focus on higher- quality content, skills, and instructional strategies (Packard & Dereshiwsky, 1991).

Some U.S. districts, along with high-achieving countries like Singapore, emphasize teacher col- laboration in their evaluation systems. This kind of measure is supported by studies finding that students have stronger achievement gains when teachers work together in teams (Jackson & Bruegmann, 2009) and when there is greater teacher collaboration for school improvement (Goddard & Goddard, 2007).

In conclusion

New approaches to teacher evaluation should take advantage of research on teacher effectiveness. While there are considerable challenges in using value-added test scores to evaluate individual teach- ers directly, using value-added methods in research can help validate measures that are productive for teacher evaluation.

Research indicates that value-added measures of student achievement tied to individual teachers should not be used for high-stakes, individual-level decisions, or comparisons across highly dissimilar schools or student populations. Valid interpretations require aggregate-level data and should ensure that background factors — including overall classroom composition — are as similar as possible across groups being compared. In general, such measures should be used only in a low-stakes fashion when they’re part of an integrated analysis of teachers’ practices.

Standards-based evaluation processes have also been found to be predictive of student learning gains and productive for teacher learning. These include systems like National Board certification and per- formance assessments for beginning teacher licens- ing as well as district and school-level instruments based on professional teaching standards. Effective systems have developed an integrated set of mea- sures that show what teachers do and what happens as a result. These measures may include evidence of student work and learning, as well as evidence of teacher practices derived from observations, video- tapes, artifacts, and even student surveys.

These tools are most effective when embedded in systems that support evaluation expertise and well- grounded decisions, by ensuring that evaluators are trained, evaluation and feedback are frequent, men- toring and professional development are available, and processes are in place to support due process

evaluate teachers four to six times a year using mas- ter/mentor teachers or principals certified in a rigor- ous four-day training. The indicators of good teach- ing are practices found to be associated with desired student outcomes. Teachers also study the rubric and its implications for teaching and learning, look at and evaluate videotaped teaching episodes using the rubric, and engage in practice evaluations. After each observation, the evaluator and teacher discuss the findings and plan for ongoing growth. Schools provide professional development, mentoring, and

classroom support to help teachers meet these stan- dards. TAP teachers say this system, along with the intensive professional development offered, is sub- stantially responsible for improving their practice and for student achievement gains in many TAP schools (Solomon, White, Cohen, & Woo, 2007).

In districts that use Peer Assistance and Review (PAR) programs, highly expert mentor teachers sup- port novice teachers and veteran teachers who are struggling, and they conduct some aspects of the evaluation. Key features of these systems include not only the evaluation instruments but also the ex- pertise of the consulting teachers or mentors, and a system of due process and review in which a panel of teachers and administrators make recommendations about personnel decisions based on evidence from the evaluations. Many systems using this approach have improved teaching while they have also become more effective in identifying teachers for continua- tion and tenure as well as intensive assistance and, where needed, dismissal (NCTAF, 1996; Van Lier, 2008).

Some systems ask teachers to assemble evidence of student learning as part of the overall judgment of effectiveness. Such evidence is drawn from class- room and school-level assessments and documenta- tion, including pre- and post-test measures of stu- dent learning in specific courses or curriculum areas, and evidence of student accomplishments in relation to teaching activities. A study of Arizona’s career lad- der program, which requires teachers to use vari- ous methods of student assessment to complement evaluations of teacher practice, found that, over time, participating teachers improved their ability to cre- ate tools to assess student learning gains; to develop and evaluate before and after tests; to define mea-

Successful systems use multiple classroom observations, expert evaluators, multiple sources of data, are timely, and provide meaningful feedback to the teacher.

V93 N6 kappanmagazine.org 15

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